Abstract. Network coding facilitates content distribution for named data networking (NDN), which improves the cache hit ratio, decreases average download time and reduces transmission amount. However, NDN is likely to cause content pollution attacks because of the cache mechanism and network coding. Request-specific network coding (RSNC) is a new class of network coding mechanism, by introducing the homomorphic hash mechanism, and this paper proposes a new method based on RSNC mechanism against content pollution attack in NDN. The new method, firstly, ensures consumers receiving linear independent coding blocks by using RSNC. Secondly, the content server adopts content-chunk-based transmission mechanism, and binds the name and content by homomorphic signing the transferred content blocks and names. Thirdly, using dynamic public key technique, our scheme authenticates each generation without updating the initial secret key. Finally, using homomorphic hash can verify the signature receives by intermediate nodes or the destination nodes. By security analysis and proof, the new method can resist the content pollution attack in the named data networking while guaranteeing the network performance and resist the Intra/Inter-GPAs at the same time.
Introduction
Named Data Networking (NDN) is one of the future Internet architecture, which name is used for routing. And router for NDN can cache content, so that data transfer is faster and the efficiency of content retrieval is improved.
However, caching the entire data block in the router makes the cache inefficient. In order to improve cache efficiency, Liu Yan et al. [1] proposed a novel scheme of Request-Specified Network Coding (RSNC) by chunk-based transmission mechanism. The scheme improves the cache hit ratio, decreases average download time and reduces transmission amount. However, relying on the cache causes the attacker carrying out some content pollution attacks (CPA) [2] . In addition, the introduction of network coding in the transmission can cause the pollution attack by the malicious nodes, resulting in the destination node can't be decoded correctly.
For CPA, NDN usually use a signature verification mechanism to resolve it [3] . NDN is named for content. For named content, the name and content will be bound together for certification [4] . The signature formula is homomorphic signature on the transferred content blocks and names. Thirdly, using dynamic public key technique, our scheme authenticates each generation without updating the initial secret key. Finally, using homomorphic hash can verify the signature receiving by intermediate nodes or the destination nodes. Our scheme is suitable for NDN, which can not only against CPA for NDN, but also effectively against Intra-GPAs / Inter-GPAs. Therefore, our scheme should resist the CPA. It needs to guarantee the three content attributes of data validity, relevance and provenance in low communication overhead and calculation cost.
RSNC Method for NDN
Liu Yan et al. [1] proposed RSNC providing network coding-based multisource content delivery mechanism, which enhances network performance. RSNC is implemented on chunk-based and hash-based routing schemes [10] .
RSNC is introduced NDN, each Interest requests for a set of chunks,
, which may be stored in different places in the network. Therefore, the Interest will be divided into several sub-Interests before arriving at the destinations. Every sub-Interest requests for a subset i U of U .
Suppose consumer1 requests for a set of original blocks 1 U , and consumer2 requests for 2 U , then linearly independent coded blocks. So, the node needs to request only n coded blocks from its upstream nodes. When || nU  , the content delivery amount required from the upstream is reduced. Therefore, we define the following aggregation operation  to combine two Interests,  
,
Un and  
Un, that must come from at least two different consumers for blocks of the same content. The aggregation operation is defined as follows: 
For similarity, we define a separation operation for dividing an Interest   , Uninto two (or more)
Interests for sending out of two (or more) different interfaces of the node toward two (or more) destinations. The dividing operation is defined as follows: 
By this way described above, an Interest   , Un will be divided several times before arriving destinations, and the sub-Interests will form a multicast tree. Suppose the tree has form in Figure 1 , where WU  , the leaf nodes of the tree do not need to send Interests to other nodes. These coded blocks will be sent back from the leaf nodes to the branch node. In the branch node, the coded blocks of   Obviously, since the same coded blocks cached in different nodes may be responded to Interests multicasted by the same consumer, the received coded blocks can't be cached in the branch node for satisfying future Interests. Therefore, each node only caches or stores original blocks. The received coded blocks will be used only for responding the pending Interests and be collected locally for gathering enough coded blocks to decode more original blocks.
RSNC-based Network Model for NDN
RSNC-based multisource content delivery in NDN, data chunks for a content item can be received from multiple sources. There are two NDN packet types: Interest and Data. The header of Interest packet contains three fields: Content Name, Selector and Nonce. In our model, the Selector needs to carry the constrain information, including generation number, the set of the original block indices and the required number of linearly independent coded blocks. Data packet contains four fields: Content Name, Signature, Signed Info and Content. The Signed Info needs to carry the coefficient of the linear combinations and generation number. The Content carries the original/coded content block. For convenience, major information of Interest packet and Data packet show as follow:
(1) :, OVm is the cumulative request contained in one or more Interests received from interface i , and the node has not responded it yet.
CPA for NDN
This section describes the scenarios of CPA for NDN.
Content pollution is an attack, in which an attacker injects fake content into the cache of router. Specifically, we can divide this attack into two types. Firstly, an attacker attempts to compromise the integrity of the content by injecting or modifying the content block of the data packet transmitted in NDN, which make consumer receiving invalidity data packet. Secondly, the attacker attempts to modify the name of the data packet in the network, but the content block of the data packet is correct and has not been modified. In this situation, the attacker is to make consumers can't retrieve the required content in order to achieve a denial of service attacks, or to make consumer getting irrelevant data packet, because the name and content do not match. The purpose of this attack is that legitimate nodes can't identify these faked content in data packets. Due to the propagation mode of the NDN, these polluted content packets will pollute the information flow of the whole network.
In this paper, we consider this kind of initiative CPA. For example, an attacker targets a specific router of R . Attacker send a polluted content to the router of R , and it will be the router of cache. Therefore, R receive a polluted content. The router will send this polluted content, leading to polluting the entire network, if it receives a real Interest packet.
RSNC-based Signature Scheme in NDN
Based on the above description of RSNC, we next further describe a RSNC-based homomorphic signature scheme. The signature scheme is shown in Figure 2 . In our scheme, the RSNC-based homomorphic signature scheme is mainly composed of four parts: Setup, Sign, Combine and Verify. 2). To facilitate multisource parallel transmission, a hash-routing scheme is employed. In the hash-routing, a content request will be forwarded to the responsible cache by matching the hash of the content identifier to one of the cache identifiers instead of the original content server. In this process, the Interest is separated and combined according to the Eq. (1) and Eq. (3), and sub-Interest reaches the routing node specified by the hash route finally. If such a sub-Interest is requested for the first time, the specified routing node haven't the requested content blocks, and the specified routing node will send the Interest to the original content server. The original content server will receive several sub-Interests from several interfaces, and  entry for content O and YV , the data packet was requested by the node. If the data packet is through the verification, the data packet carried original block is added to CS , data packet carried coded block is added to cache temporarily. The entry of PIT OUT  is updated or deleted. The node checks out whether more original blocks can be obtained by decoding the blocks in CS and Cache. If the data packet can't pass the verification, the node discards it. Then, the data packet is forwarded according to Algorithm 3 described in [1] . Finally, the consumer (destination node) caches linearly independent data packet about O in order to recover the original content. The verification algorithm is as follows. 
Correctness and Security
Homomorphism of Hash Function ( ) H Currently, most signature algorithms are based on homomorphic hash function, and Korhn etc. [11] use homomorphic hash function construct the verification algorithm. Then prove the homogeneity of the hash function in our scheme.
A trusted party globally generates a set of hash parameters Next, we prove the security of this algorithm in two aspects as follows. The security of intra-GPAs Suppose all messages in following proof from the id -th generation. .
